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NATO's Uncertain Future
By Jeff Lukens
Russia’s invasion of
Georgia in August marked a return to their historic pattern of imperial
conquest. Without confronting NATO directly, Vladimir Putin signaled he
intends to keep Georgia and Ukraine in Russia's sphere of influence, and
keep them from joining NATO. Putin can now bully other Eastern European
countries as well to sway their policies away from the West and toward
Russia. If any of these countries fail to comply, the implied message is
they can expect a fate similar to Georgia.
The European Union
gets more that a quarter of its oil from Russia, and the pipeline
through Georgia is the only oil from the Caspian oil fields not
controlled by Russia or Iran. Putin now is able to shut it down anytime
he wants to.
The attack on
Georgia also exposed a dangerous overextension of NATO forces in Eastern
Europe, and United States forces around the world. Power abhors a
vacuum, and when there is any uncertainty about it in the Kremlin,
instability follows. Putin has proven Russia will brutally fill any
power void around them. NATO needs to reexamine its long-term strategic
purpose, and determine what it should do about a newly aggressive and
revitalized Russia.
There are two
compelling sides to the debate over what to do. One line of reasoning
says we should promote democracies everywhere, and holds that Russia
must face the consequences for its actions. Naked aggression will happen
again if unanswered. If Russia wants to act like the USSR, then NATO
should treat it as it treated the USSR. For the alliance to cave now
would only heighten the possibility of armed conflict later. Promoting
democracy would ultimately mean supporting NATO membership for Georgia
and Ukraine. If we offer them membership, however, we must be prepared
to defend them. And this we are not able to do.
The other line of
thinking says we should recognize the Russian sphere of influence in
Eastern Europe, and not tread on their turf. NATO has already committed
more to the region than it is prepared to support. No one wants to go to
war over Georgia or Ukraine, and the US cannot confront the Russians
alone.
While Russia's
neighbors worry about the renewed threat, Western Europe, and Germany
especially, care more about their oil. Eastern Europe has been under the
Russian domination before and has no intention on going back to it
again. This makes for a divide in NATO that is quite literally big
enough to drive a tank through -- which of course Putin is not above
doing. This political fissure could ultimately unravel the alliance.
NATO served its
purpose well until the collapse of the Soviet Union. But unlike the
Soviet Union in 1991, Russia is currently flush with cash. With a
declining population and a single source economy, Putin apparently
believes he needs to act now because time is not on his side. He knows
the US is overextended in the Middle East, and now is the time to
reassert Russian dominance in Eastern Europe before the US can capably
respond.
Besides attacking
Georgia, Putin has threatened to dismember large portions of Ukraine if
it joins NATO. Even if Georgia had been a member of NATO, it is
questionable whether any ally in Western Europe would have been willing
to fight for them. As NATO has expanded its boundaries toward the
Russian border, the military power that backs the alliance has become
more diluted and less likely to honor its commitments. The alliance has
written checks it is not able to cash.
The Baltic States
present a special problem. These former Soviet republics all have large
Russian populations within their borders. If Russia brings its armies to
the borders of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, would anyone in NATO send
troops there to honor the alliance's guarantees? Possibly not. And
definitely it would not in the numbers necessary to turn back an
invasion.
In 1914, a series
of misunderstandings and miscalculations that started in the Balkans
lead to World War One. A similar set of misunderstandings and
miscalculations may be awaiting us in the Baltics. With these countries
already members of NATO, such uncertainty before a confrontive Russia
could escalate into a larger war with the West.
Another piece on
Putin’s chessboard is Iran. He knows the US wants out of Iraq, and to do
so completely we will need to contain Iran. The US needs Russian support
for economic sanctions to work against Teheran, which sets the stage for
Putin to offer up a deal: The US gets its way with Iran in exchange for
Russian domination of Georgia and Ukraine. It may be an offer we find
hard to refuse.
The only
diplomatic leverage we can exact on Russia now is to exclude them from
the WTO, the G-8, and other international economic organizations, and
such actions take time to work. And while the threat of exclusion is of
no major concern to Putin, the flight of capital from the West is
already exacting a toll in Russian financial markets as nervous
investors pull back.
Global financial
markets have punished Russia much more quickly than any diplomatic
sanctions ever could. And the economic toll served on Russia has been
severe. The RTS stock index in Moscow has fallen by more than half since
May. The exodus of foreign capitol and the collapse of domestic credit
have transformed the mood in Moscow from boldness to dismay. Putin is
unlikely to reverse course, however, unless he is forced to by a
collapse in the price of oil.
From any rational
standpoint, the need for the US to more fully develop its petroleum
resources has never been clearer. More immediately, some vital decisions
need to be made about NATO's future. By drawing clear lines between
Russia and NATO, we can help stabilize the region. NATO must be firm
with Russia about its respect for rules in dealing with other countries,
or accept the position that Russian aggression is the price it must pay
to keep oil flowing to Europe.
Russia's attack on
Georgia was not an isolated event. Their historic pattern of conquest
will not go away because we wish it away. The events in August marked
the return of geopolitics as it has been played since the dawn of
civilization.
We cannot just say
that NATO must adjust to new realities or fade away into irrelevancy. We
may soon discover a greater danger lies in security promises made to
Eastern European states that we cannot militarily support, which Putin
misreads, and then becomes a major war. NATO must show commitment and
clarity of purpose to prevent such a catastrophe.
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